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MAITE RAGAZZO, (Individual Capacity);  
15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; CHESTER COUNTY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-06170) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance 
May 13, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Amro Elansari, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from 
an order by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the 
important facts and procedural history.  Elansari was arrested and convicted in 2015 for 
various marijuana-related offenses.  He was again arrested in 2017 and was sentenced to 
probation, which he began serving in Centre County, Pennsylvania.  At some point in 
2018, Elansari moved, and his probation was transferred to Chester County, 
Pennsylvania.  Elansari alleged that after he moved, defendant Maite Ragazzo, a Chester 
County probation officer, told him that the office was going to continue to drug test 
probationers regardless of Pennsylvania’s 2016 law legalizing the use of medical 
marijuana.  Elansari states that he moved to Philadelphia because of this conversation. 
In December 2020, Elansari filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that 
his equal protection rights were violated by Ragazzo’s comments and that the county 
maintained an unconstitutional policy as to probationers who used marijuana for medical 
purposes.1  Elansari seeks declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, 
and injunctive relief against Ragazzo, the 15th Judicial District, and Chester County.2 
 
1 In June 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a state parole office’s policy 
of prohibiting probationers from the active use of medical marijuana violated 
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 Counsel for defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  Elansari opposed the motion and filed a 
motion to amend the complaint to add unnamed supervisors to the action.  The District 
Court dismissed Elansari’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) explaining that his 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot, that the 15th Judicial District and 
Chester County were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that Elansari had failed 
to state an equal protection claim, and that the claim against Ragazzo was time-barred.3  
The District Court denied Elansari’s motion to amend his complaint, except to the extent 
that he moved to strike claims related to comments made by a state court judge, and 
concluded that further amendment would be futile.  Elansari timely filed his notice of 
appeal.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
 
Pennsylvania law.  Gass v. 52nd Judicial Dist., Lebanon Cty., 232 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa. 
2020). 
2 Elansari subsequently filed a state court action against Ragazzo to recover 
compensatory damages for his move to Philadelphia.  He alleged that his filing and court 
proceedings made the state court judge “furious” and stated that the judge informed him 
that he was going to report the matter to the Centre County probation authorities.  
Elansari’s § 1983 complaint initially alleged that the state court’s actions were 
impermissible retaliation that violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.  Elansari 
subsequently moved to strike any aspect of his complaint related to the state court 
proceedings, and the District Court granted the motion. 
3 The District Court also found that it did not have jurisdiction over any state law claims, 
although those appear to have been dismissed pursuant to Elansari’s motion. 
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220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate where a complaint has not alleged 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  We accept all factual allegations in the complaint 
as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Fleisher v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012), and because Elansari is proceeding 
pro se, we construe his complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 
(2007) (per curiam).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial 
question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III 
We agree with the District Court’s assessment that Elansari’s complaint was 
insufficient to state a civil rights action against defendants.  As the District Court 
explained, Elansari’s claims for unspecified prospective relief against the 15th Judicial 
District and Chester County were mooted by his move to Philadelphia and the 
corresponding transfer of his parole, as he “no longer has any present interest affected by 
[their] polic[ies].”  Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148 (1975).  Moreover, because 
Elansari has not alleged that he intends to move back to Chester County or that the parole 
office has continued its alleged policy following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2020 
decision, he cannot demonstrate that the alleged wrong is “capable of repetition yet 
evading review.”  Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2017) (capable-of-
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repetition doctrine is narrow mootness exception that “applies only in exceptional 
situations” where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated 
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 
523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). 
We further agree with the District Court that the claims for damages against the 
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit and Chester County are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  
See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“Pennsylvania’s judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”) (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 
426 F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005)); Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“The Pennsylvania legislature has, by statute, expressly declined to waive its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). 
Additionally, we agree with the District Court that Elansari’s allegations regarding 
defendant Ragazzo’s comments failed to establish either a constitutional violation or a 
plausible equal protection claim. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting 
under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the 
laws of the United States.”).  Setting aside Elansari’s failure to allege that he obtained a 
medical marijuana card, the ability to access medical marijuana is not a “right secured by 
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”  Id. (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
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Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) 
(Controlled Substances Act provisions criminalizing manufacture, distribution, or 
possession of marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes 
did not violate Commerce Clause); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (holding that there is no medical-necessity 
exception to the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibitions on manufacturing and 
distributing marijuana); Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (no 
fundamental right to use marijuana prescribed by a physician to alleviate pain).4 
We also agree with the District Court that Elansari’s claim fails under a traditional 
theory of equal protection because he has not shown that he obtained a medical marijuana 
card or, even if he had, that an individual who uses medical marijuana is a member of a 
protected class.  See Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that Elansari’s claim fails under a 
class-of-one theory because he has not demonstrated that he qualified for or obtained a 
medical marijuana card, was not charged with violating his probation for using marijuana 
for medical reasons, and did not allege he was treated differently from other probationers 
who obtained or intended to obtain a medical marijuana card.  See Phillips v. Cty. of 
 
4 This Court has rejected Elansari’s arguments in prior cases alleging similar violations of 
his rights arising out of his use of marijuana.  See Elansari v.United States, 823 F. App’x 
107, 111 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (marijuana users are not members of a protected 
class); Elansari v. United States, 615 F. App’x 760, 762 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 




Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (To prevail under a class-of-one theory, 
plaintiff bears the burden of showing he “was intentionally treated differently from others 
similarly situated . . . and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”).  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Elansari leave to amend his 
complaint where the court aptly evaluated his response to the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss and his proposed amended complaint and concluded that it would not cure the 
defects from his complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002).5  
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the motion for 
summary affirmance and will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
5 The District Court also correctly determined that the claims against Ragazzo were time-
barred and that Elansari did not raise a particularized claim against the unknown 
supervisors alleged in his proposed amended complaint.  Elansari’s state law claims were 
dismissed upon Elansari’s own motion to strike, given that the claims were rooted in the 
dismissed allegations. 
